Healthcare ran late on cybersecurity until ransomware made it impossible to ignore. Today the regulatory pressure stacks: NIS2 brings most hospitals and large clinic groups in scope as essential entities, GDPR has always covered the clinical data, and MDR and IVDR put new cybersecurity obligations on the medical-device makers.
Sandline runs vulnerability programmes that survive the operational reality of hospital IT — segmented OT, legacy modalities, sometimes air-gapped, often understaffed. The output is evidence the DSP and the data-protection authority can read, and a remediation plan the under-resourced IT team can actually execute.
Typical engagements
- Vulnerability assessment across IT, OT and clinical systems
- Pentest of patient portals, telemedicine apps and HIS / EMR
- Medical-device security assessment under MDR Annex I
- Phishing simulation for clinical and admin staff
- IR retainer with NIS2 + GDPR notification packages
Sector-specific threats
Ransomware on the clinical estate
The defining incident pattern for the sector. We focus on the realistic recovery path — backups proven by tabletop, segmented from the production estate, and able to bring critical clinical services back inside SLA.
Patient-data exposure via misconfigured cloud storage
A persistent finding in our healthcare pentests. We test cloud-account configuration end-to-end and build the IAM hardening into the remediation plan.
Insecure medical-device firmware
The MDR cybersecurity essential requirements catch up with this. We test devices and the back-end services they call against Annex I.